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RESEARCH OF EGNOS RELIABILITY IN KIEV 
A research of EGNOS work was conducted with a help of a receiver, working in the mode of receiving 
differential corrections, to find if EGNOS can be used in Ukraine without building a ground station. 
Introduction 
EGNOS - European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service is a system of space functional 
augmentation type SBAS intended to improve performance of GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO on 
the territory of Europe. 
Starting from October 1 2009, EGNOS Open Service provides signal transmission on a 
satellite navigation receiver with EGNOS option. EGNOS Safety of Life service has become 
available from March 2nd 2011. Space signals are used for typical safety-critical operation like 
APV-1, APV-2 and CAT-1 on the territory of Western Europe. 
The goal of this work is experimental estimation of EGNOS system performance quality in 
Ukraine(Kiev particularly)  after it has been declared availiable. The processing of the experimental 
data is performed with PEGASUS software. 
Setting the goal of the research 
The goal of the research consists in receiving of the experimental data from GPS and 
corrections from geostationary satellites AOR-E, IOR-W and Artemis, which are used in EGNOS. 
 The received messages are processed by PEGASUS software. Using the results conclusions 
are made if the characteristics of the navigational system fit to the safety requirements of the 
aviation users. 
The coordinates of the receiving station were measured with 5 cm accuracy and considered as 
the basic point. 
The screen of the receiving station is shown on the Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 Station screen. 
At the screen GPS satellites and geostationary 120 and 124 satellites, which transmit the 
messages with corrections, are seen. GLONASS satellites can also be seen on the picture, but they 
do not use the EGNOS system and therefore are not considered as the part of experiment. 
The main characteristics were researched, such as: accuracy (the deviation of coordinates in 
horizontal and vertical planes from the coordinates of the basic point), the availability of 
ionospheric corrections(the piercing points of ionosphere), integrity of data and continuity. 
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 Research results 
The research of 12th march 2011 is given as an example as typical result. 
In order to assess the results general safety requirements for SBAS are presented in table 1. 
Table 1 














En-route 3.7 km (2.0 NM) N/A 
1 – 1 × 10-
7/h 5 min 
1 – 1 × 10-




En-route Terminal 0.74 km (0.4 NM) N/A 
1 – 1 × 10-
7/h 15 s 
1 – 1 × 10-









220 m (720 
ft) N/A 
1 –1x10-
7/h 10 s 
1 – 1x10-4/h 








16 m (52 ft) 20 m (66 ft)
1 – 2 × 10-
7 per 
approach 







16 m (52 ft) 8 m (26 ft) 
1 – 2 × 10-
7 per 
approach 
6 s 1 – 8 × 10-6 in any 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Category I precision 
Approach 16 m (52 ft) 
6.0 m to 4.0 
m (20 ft to 
13 ft) 
1 – 2 × 10-
7 per 
approach 




Accuracy in horizontal plane(fig. 2) is displayed as the deviations on North-South and East-




Fig. 2 Accuracy in horizontal plane 
The horizontal accuracy of APV-1 category is 1.89 m.  Vertical accuracy of APV – 2 is 1.49 
m. Both measures were defined from the epochs when APV – 1 was available for normal operation  
by statistical methods and fit to the requirements for accuracy in table 1.  
 
Fig. 3 Availability of piercing points of Ionosphere 
The map of availability of  the atmosphere piercing points is displayed on fig.3 . Coordinates 
of Kiev are 30° 30' east 50° 27' north. Availiability for piercing points: 100 % for sattelites to the 
west, decreasing to the south and north, rapid fall to 30-40 % for satellites to the east.  
In order to analyze integrity Stanford plot is used. The measurements which correspond to 
typical operations of APV-1, APV-2 and CAT-1 for horizontal and vertical planes are shown on 




Fig. 4. Horisontal Stanford plot 
 
Fig. 5.  Vertical Stanford plot 
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Information about categories is shown in table 2. On the pic 4 and 5 on horizontal axis 
precision errors are plotted for horizontal (hpe) and vertical (vpe)  planes respectfully, on the 
vertical axes we have alarm limits for horizontal (hpl) and vertical planes (vpl)  respectfully. 
From 20039 valid epochs on pic. 4 11467 epochs are fit for safety critical operations,  5968 
epochs exceed the alarm limit of 40 m and 2462 fit only for NPA. From 20039 valid epochs on 
pic. 5 10366 epochs are fit for APV-1, 5302 for APV-2, no for CAT-1. 1767 epochs exceed the 
alarm limit of 50 m and 2604 have no precision availiable. 
There was no misleading information in the research so according to table 1, integrity 
requirements are met. 
Table 2 
ICAO SARPs high level integrity requirements 
 
Typical operation Time to Alarm Integrity Hor. alert limit Vert. alert limit
NPA 10 s 1-10-7/h 0.3 NM N/A 
APV I 10 s 1-2x10-7/app 40.0 m 50 m 
APV II 6 s 1-2x10-7/app 40.0 m 20 m 
CAT I 6 s 1-2x10-7/app 40.0 m 15 - 10 m 
 
The most problematic parameter for Ukraine is continuity which is increadibly bad. The 
discontinuity events for position solution are listed in table 3.  Discontinuity events for APV – 1 
are listed in table 4. 
Duration – time for which discontinuity lasts. 
Stable period – time which system run from last discontinuity end to the start of current. 
Table 3 
Position discontinuity events 
 
Epoch Duration, s stable period, s 
579503 105 1942 
579766 53 158 
584309 168 4490 
587212 320 2735 
591536 1286 4004 
595953 1 3131 
595955 66 1 









Discontinuity events for APV-I 
 
Epoch Duration, s stable period, s 
579503 105 1942 
579766 213 158 
581263 800 1284 
584309 457 2246 
585341 1424 1 
587212 320 447 
591536 1963 4004 
593623 165 3 
593793 152 1 
594406 12 1 
594738 324 320 
 
The low continuity highly influences the overall availability of EGNOS in Ukraine. In the 
research APV-1 is available only 57.223% and APV-2 – only 26.458% which makes a substantial 
difference from the standards listed in table 1. 
Conclusions 
The results state the weak signal quality of EGNOS  in Kiev, so that it can not be used for any 
safety critical operations until a RIMS station is placed. 
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